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Abstract 
Game Reasoning Theory (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986a) contends that moral reasoning 
regresses to a more selfish stage of moral development in sport compared to everyday life. 
The view that moral reasoning is moderated by context (bracketed morality) came from 
analyzing responses to dilemmas set in sport and life contexts that concerned moral issues 
about harm and fairness. The phenomenon has been extended to moral behavior: frequency of 
antisocial and prosocial behavior differs between sport and life. Evidence that the sign of the 
difference depends on the insider-outsider status of the recipient of the behavior highlights 
how in-group loyalty principles can influence bracketed moral behavior. To prove this 
explanation, the present study assessed moral behavior and moral reasoning in sport and life 
contexts in college athletes. Participants responded to moral dilemmas by indicating the 
likelihood that they would act antisocially or prosocially and rating the moral wrongness of 
action/inaction. They also reported the frequency of carrying out the same behaviors in the 
past few months. Likelihood of antisocial opponent/student behavior (intimidation) was more 
frequent in sport than life whereas antisocial teammate/student (criticism) and prosocial 
opponent behaviors (help) were less frequent in sport than life. The sport-life difference for 
intimidation likelihood was fully mediated by moral wrongness and past moral behavior 
whereas the difference in helping was partially mediated by wrongness. These findings 
confirm cross-context linkages between moral thought and action and reveal a more nuanced 
aspect to bracketed morality that considers in-group loyalty when understanding moral 
reasoning and behavior in sport and life. 
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Moral Thought and Action in Sport and Life: A Study of Bracketed Morality 
Sport is a social context which poses moral dilemmas between individuals and groups of 
individuals surrounding principles of care/harm, fairness/cheating and loyalty/betrayal (for 
reviews, see Kavussanu, 2008, 2012). The belief that professional sportsmen and 
sportswomen could or should serve as moral role models for their fans and supporters is a 
popular one. It is perhaps with a sense of schadenfreude that the media report stories about 
the misdemeanors of athletes in their everyday lives. The relative merits of these contrasting 
views – the athlete as saint or sinner – have remarkably little supporting evidence one way or 
the other. Indeed, aside from occasional anecdotal reports, we know surprisingly little about 
the consistency of athletes’ moral conduct in and away from the sporting arena (for review 
see Kimble, Russo, Bergman, & Galindo, 2010). The present research was designed to 
improve our understanding of this issue. 
Bredemeier and her colleagues pioneered the study of whether sport has its own morality. 
Participants were presented with moral dilemmas about harm and fairness, and their moral 
reasoning was classified, based on Haan’s (1978) interactional theory of moral development, 
as being assimilative (favoring their own needs), accommodative (favoring the needs of 
others), or equilibrative (considering everyone’s needs). Bredemeier and Shields (1984) 
reported that sport-based (game) reasoning was more egocentric than life reasoning among 
high school and college athletes and non-athletes. Based on further analysis of part of this 
dataset, Bredemeier and Shields (1986a) reported a slight shift in the distribution of 
assimilative, accommodative and equilibrative reasoning from 13%, 84% and 3% in the life 
context to 24%, 75% and 1% in the sport context. This evidence was used by Bredemeier and 
Shields (1986a, 1986b) to formulate the concept of bracketed morality, referring to the 
transitory adoption of more egocentric moral reasoning in sport compared to everyday life. In 
a follow-up study, Bredemeier (1994, 1995) posed moral dilemmas to investigate moral 
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reasoning in sport and daily life among children, aged 10-13 years, who were enrolled on a 
summer sports camp. She found that the older children, aged 12 and 13, exhibited more 
egocentric moral reasoning in sport than life. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
sport-life differences in moral reasoning are sometimes evident among adolescents and young 
adults.  
The theory of game reasoning was formulated from data generated when participants were 
presented with moral dilemmas set in sport and life contexts. The first protocol (Bredemeir, 
1984, Bredemeier & Shields, 1986a, 1986b) posed two sport-based dilemmas that concerned 
(a) a football player instructed by his coach to injure an opponent, and (b) a basketball player 
who decided whether to help an endangered opponent who played dirty, and two life-based 
dilemmas that concerned (c) a middle-aged married man involved with his young secretary, 
and (d) a person deciding whether to keep a promise and repay someone who needed the 
money to help his hungry family. Thus, differences in the content and issues raised by the 
dilemmas in the two contexts could have contributed to the reported sport-life differences in 
moral reasoning. Accordingly, the second protocol (Bredemeier, 1994, 1995) posed two 
dilemmas concerning (a) boys deciding whether to harm another boy acting unfairly, and (b) 
girls choosing between being honest and keeping a promise to a friend, with versions of each 
adapted for both sport and life contexts. The findings generated by these two protocols 
provided the empirical foundation for game reasoning theory. Thus, the evidence for game 
reasoning is rather limited in both content (i.e., to a few dilemmas) and extent (i.e., to 
subsamples of two datasets). Given that game reasoning has never been independently 
replicated in the thirty years since it was first reported further investigation of this widely-
cited phenomenon is clearly warranted. 
The aforementioned papers by Bredemeir and Shields only examined differences in moral 
reasoning, or how participants think about moral issues in sport and daily life. In an extension 
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of this line of research, Kavussanu, Boardley, Sagar and Ring (2013) recently investigated 
whether bracketed morality in sport extends to moral behavior. Two large studies compared 
the frequency of prosocial and antisocial behavior in sport (toward opponents and teammates) 
and life (toward other students at university). Prosocial behavior comprises actions intended 
to benefit or help another (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998), such as encouraging or helping an 
opponent. Antisocial behavior comprises actions intended to disadvantage or harm another 
(Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006), such as cheating and trying to injure an opponent. 
Kavussanu and her colleagues found that the college athletes exhibited higher antisocial 
behavior toward opponents, lower prosocial behavior toward opponents, and higher prosocial 
behavior toward teammates in sport than toward other students at university. These findings 
extended the concept of bracketed morality to the moral behavior of college athletes. 
Importantly, they underscore the importance of distinguishing the status of the targets of the 
behaviors in question and thereby paint a more complex picture of the ways in which 
morality (moral thought and action) may be influenced by different social environments. The 
psychology of group dynamics concerning in-group loyalty and out-group disloyalty tells us 
that people act favorably toward members of their group and unfavorably towards outsiders 
(e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). 
Interestingly, in-group loyalty has been laid down as a cornerstone ethical principle in moral 
foundations theory by Haidt and colleagues (e.g., Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, 
Wojcik, & Ditto, 2013). In sum, the in-group versus out-group distinction should help 
enhance our understanding of bracketed moral reasoning and behavior. 
The present report was designed to investigate Bredemeier and Shields’ (1986a, 1986b) 
theory of game reasoning and had two purposes. The first purpose was to determine whether 
intended antisocial (harming) and prosocial (caring) behavior directed towards in-group and 
out-group individuals, moral reasoning, and past behavior differed between sport and life 
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contexts. The second purpose was to explore whether current moral reasoning or past 
behavior mediated any effects of context on intended behavior. Our hypotheses were tested 
using new analyses performed on a larger dataset (see Kavussanu, et al., 2013, Study 2). 
 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were male (n = 210) and female (n = 162) student athletes who played team 
sport (American football, basketball, field hockey, netball, and soccer) for a university club. 
These sports have been classified as medium-to-high contact sports with high potential to 
raise moral issues (Bredemeier, Weiss, Shields, & Cooper, 1986). These young adults (M = 
19.82, SD = 1.53 years) had competed in their sport for an average of 7.40 (SD = 4.55) years. 
  
Dilemmas: Intended Behavior and Wrongness 
Moral dilemmas about issues of harm and care were used to assess intended moral action 
and moral reasoning. Each scenario was modified for sport and life contexts. The dilemmas 
were adapted from previous research (e.g., Kavusanu & Roberts, 2001; Stanger et al., 2012, 
2013; Stephens, 2000) and described an intentional (deliberate) antisocial act aiming to harm 
another person or a prosocial act aiming to help another person. To assess behavioral 
intentions, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would act as described 
in each dilemma on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all likely, 7 = extremely likely) as per previous 
studies (e.g., Stanger, et al., 2013; Stephens, 2000; Stephens & Bredemeier, 1996). 
Participants were also asked to rate how morally wrong it would be to act antisocially 
(intimidation and criticism dilemmas) or fail to act prosocially (stop to help and lending 
dilemmas) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all wrong, 7 = extremely wrong). The four pairs of 
dilemmas were as follows: 
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1. Intimidation Dilemma (antisocial behavior toward an opponent / a student). The sport 
context read: “During a regular game, a player from the opposing team tries to wind you 
up by repeatedly making annoying remarks about you. When the referee is not looking, 
you have the opportunity to physically intimidate him/her.” The life context read: “You 
are in a pub and one of your friends has brought a friend whom you don’t know. This 
person tries to wind you up by repeatedly making annoying remarks about you. When 
nobody can see you, you have the opportunity to physically intimidate him/her.” After 
reading each dilemma, they were asked “How likely are you to physically intimidate this 
player / person?” and “Do you think that physically intimidating this player / person is 
morally wrong?” which they answered by providing likelihood and wrongness ratings on 
the 7-point scales described above. 
2. Criticism Dilemma (antisocial behavior toward a teammate / student).  The sport context 
read: “During a regular game, one of your teammates makes a mistake, which costs your 
team the game. After the game, you have the opportunity to criticize him/her.”  The life 
context read: “During a class presentation by your group, one of the group members 
makes a mistake, which costs your group a high mark. After the class, you have the 
opportunity to criticize him/her.” They were then asked “How likely are you to criticize 
this teammate / student?” and “Do you think that criticizing this teammate / student is 
morally wrong?” 
3. Stop to Help Dilemma (prosocial behavior toward an opponent / a student).  The sport 
context read: “During a regular game, an opposing player falls to the ground. He/she 
appears hurt and in need of help. Your team has the ball and is in a scoring position. You 
are the only one who has seen the player’s distress. You have the opportunity to ask your 
teammate to stop play.” The life context read: “You are on your way to give a class 
presentation when you see a student fall to the ground. He/she appears hurt and in need 
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of help. You are the only person who has seen him/her in distress, but if you stop you may 
be late for your presentation. You have the opportunity to go over and help this student.” 
They were then asked “How likely are you to ask your teammate to stop play / go over 
and help this student?” and “Do you think that refraining from asking your teammate to 
stop play / ignoring this student is morally wrong?” 
4. Lending Dilemma (prosocial behavior toward an opponent /a student).  The sport context 
read: “Before a regular home game, the opposing team’s captain tells you that they did 
not bring suitable kit. Thus, they cannot play, and your team will win the game by default. 
You have the opportunity to lend your opponents your spare kit.”  The life context read: 
“A student whom you do not know well has lost his/her lecture notes. He/she needs to 
study for next week’s test and asks you to lend him/her your notes overnight to copy. You 
have the opportunity to lend this student your notes.” They were then asked “How likely 
are you to lend your opponents your spare kit / this student your notes?” and “Do you 
think that refusing to lend your opponents your spare kit / this student your notes is 
morally wrong?” 
 
Past Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior 
Three items from the Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Sport Scale (Kavussanu & 
Boardley, 2009; Kavussanu, Stanger & Boardley, 2013) were used to assess past antisocial 
behavior towards opponents and students (“physically intimidated an opponent / a student”), 
antisocial behavior towards teammates and students (“criticized an opponent / a student”), 
and prosocial behavior toward opponents and students (“asked to stop play when an 
opponent was injured / sought help for a student who was hurt”). Participants were asked to 
think about their experiences – when playing sport this season / with other students this 
academic year – and indicate how often they engaged in each behavior. Responses were 
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made on a scale anchored by 1 (never) and 5 (very often). There was no item concerning 
lending behavior. 
 
Procedure 
After obtaining approval from university ethics committee and permission from the clubs 
and head coaches, student athletes were approached by one of two research assistants. Data 
were collected either before or after a training session. Data collection started two months 
into the sporting season and university term and took place over a three-month period. The 
students were informed of the study’s aims, that participation was voluntary, honesty in 
responses was vital, and data would be kept strictly confidential and would be used only for 
research purposes. After signing an informed consent form, volunteers completed the sport-
based section of the protocol followed by the life-based section of the protocol, or vice versa, 
with the order counterbalanced across participants. 
 
Results 
 
Moral Thought and Action in Sport and Life 
The first purpose of the present study was to compare the moral action and moral 
reasoning of male and female student athletes in sport and life contexts. The likelihood and 
wrongness data from the dilemmas are displayed in Figure 1. The results of the Analyses of 
Variance (ANOVAs), with Context (sport, life) as the within-subjects factor and Gender 
(male, female) as the between-subjects factor, on each variable are summarized in Table 1. 
Main effects for context were noted for intended antisocial and prosocial behavior. 
Intimidatory antisocial opponent/student behavior (Msport = 3.05 > Mlife = 2.72) was more 
likely to happen in sport than life whereas criticizing antisocial teammate/student behavior 
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(Msport = 2.64 < Mlife = 3.03) and stopping to help prosocial opponent/student behavior (Msport 
= 4.24 < Mlife = 5.57) were less likely to happen in the sport context. Gender differences 
emerged for some behaviors. Specifically, males were most likely to intimidate 
opponents/student (Mmale = 3.29 > Mfemale = 2.48) and least likely to stop to help 
opponents/students (Mmale = 4.65 < Mfemale = 5.22). A solitary context × gender interaction 
was found for intended prosocial behavior (i.e., stopping to help an injured person): both 
genders were less likely to help in sport than life whereas males indicated that they were less 
likely to help than females in the sport context but equally likely to help in the life context.  
The wrongness judgments for each dilemma were evaluated using ANOVA (Table 1). 
Antisocial behavior toward opponents/students (intimidation) was judged to be less wrong in 
sport (Msport = 4.35 < Mlife = 4.74) whereas prosocial inaction was judged to be less wrong for 
stopping to help (Msport = 4.43 < Mlife = 5.60) and more wrong for lending (Msport = 4.58 > 
Mlife = 4.21) in the sport context. Similarly, males deemed it less wrong to act antisocially 
(Mmale = 4.00 < Mfemale = 5.09) and to fail to act prosocially (stop to help: Mmale = 4.81 < 
Mfemale = 5.22; lending: Mmale = 4.23 < Mfemale = 4.57) towards opponents/students compared 
to females. 
The influence of context and gender on the frequency of intimidation, criticism, and 
stopping to help behavior in the past season/term are summarized in Table 1. Main effects for 
context and gender were noted for each behavior. Intimidation (antisocial opponent/student 
behavior) was more frequent (Msport = 2.15 > Mlife = 1.49), criticism (antisocial 
teammate/student behavior) less frequent (Msport = 1.92 < Mlife = 2.16), and stopping to help 
someone (prosocial opponent/student behavior) was less frequent (Msport = 2.49 < Mlife = 
2.74) in the sport than the life context. Compared to females, the males engaged more 
frequently in intimidation (Mmale = 1.96 > Mfemale = 1.68), more frequently in criticism (Mmale 
= 2.17 > Mfemale = 1.92), and less frequently in stopping to help someone in need (Mmale = 
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2.44 < Mfemale = 2.80). The interaction effect reflected the finding that men intimidated more 
often than women in a sport but not a life context. 
 
Mediation of Intended Behavior by Moral Reasoning and Past Behavior 
The second purpose of the present study was to determine whether the effect of context on 
intended moral behavior was mediated by current moral reasoning and past moral behavior. 
This was undertaken using within-subjects mediation (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001). 
We also investigated moderation as this is an integral part of the analysis. We conducted 
multiple linear regression analyses predicting the sport-life difference in intended likelihood 
to behave from the corresponding sport-life difference in wrongness judgments across 
contexts and the mean-centered sum of the wrongness judgments in the two contexts. 
Mediation is inferred when the context difference in a predictor predicts the difference in the 
outcome: It is deemed full (or partial) when the intercept is not (or remains) significantly 
different from zero. Finally, moderation is affirmed when the mean-centered sum predicts the 
difference in the outcome (Judd et al., 2001). 
Moral Reasoning. In the case of intimidation of opponents/students, the sport-life 
difference in likelihood to behave was negatively predicted by the associated change in the 
wrongness judgment, B = –0.39, 95% CI [–0.49, –0.29], t = 7.53, p < .001. The intercept was 
not significantly different from zero, B = 0.13, 95% CI [–0.42, 0.68], t = 0.47, p = .64, 
indicating that moral reasoning was a full mediator of the effect of context on this intended 
antisocial opponent/student behavior. No moderation occurred. In the case of stopping to help 
opponents/students, the sport-life difference in likelihood to behave was positively predicted 
by the associated change in the wrongness judgment, B = 0.34, 95% CI [0.24, 0.43], t = 6.90, 
p < .001. That the intercept remained significantly different from zero, B = –2.01, 95% CI [–
2.86, –1.16], t = 4.66, p < .001, indicated that moral reasoning was a partial mediator of the 
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effect of context on this intended prosocial opponent/student behavior. Finally, the mean-
centered sum of judged wrongness of inaction positively predicted (i.e., moderated) the 
difference in likely prosocial opponent/student behavior, B = 0.10, 95% CI [0.02, 0.18], t = 
2.56, p < .02; thus, the lower their overall moral righteousness the less likely was the person 
to stop and help in sport than life. 
Past Behavior.  In the case of intimidation of opponents/students, the sport-life difference 
in likelihood to behave was positively predicted by the associated change in past behavior, B 
= 0.19, 95% CI [0.03, 0.35], t = 2.27, p < .03. The intercept was not significantly different 
from zero, B = –0.41, 95% CI [–0.89, 0.08], t = 1.65, p = .10, indicating that past behavior 
was a full mediator of the effect of context on future intimidatory behavior. The mean-
centered sum of past intimidation positively predicted the difference in likely future behavior, 
B = 0.16, 95% CI [0.03, 0.29], t = 2.44, p < .02; thus, there was moderation whereby the more 
frequently the person intimidated others in the past the more likely were they to intimidate 
more often in sport than life. In the case of criticism of teammates/students, the mean-
centered sum of past behavior positively predicted the difference in likely criticism of 
opponents/students, B = –1.21, 95% CI [–1.75,–0.66], t = 4.34, p < .001, signaling 
moderation: intended criticism was less in sport than life among those who overall were more 
critical. No mediation occurred for criticism. Finally, stopping to help was moderated by past 
behavior, B = –2.17, 95% CI [–2.80,–1.54], t = 6.75, p < .001, such that failing to stop and 
help someone was less in sport than life among those who overall helped less. 
 
Discussion 
The present study evaluated bracketed morality of thought and action by comparing the 
moral reasoning and behavior in sport and life of college athletes. With regard to the study’s 
first purpose, we found sport-life differences in intended moral behavior, moral reasoning, 
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and past moral behavior. The study provided evidence of bracketed moral behavior: 
responses to the moral dilemmas indicated that intimidation of opponents/students was more 
likely to happen in sport than life whereas criticizing teammates/students and stopping to help 
opponents/students were less likely to happen in the sport context. Responses to the moral 
dilemmas also provided evidence of game reasoning: harm (intimidation) was judged to be 
less wrong in sport whereas lack of caring was judged to be less wrong for stopping to help 
and more wrong for lending in the sport context. Further, based on recall of their own recent 
past behavior in sport and life, the participants reported that they intimidated opponents more 
than students at university, criticized teammates less than students, and helped opponents less 
than students. With regard to the study’s second purpose, the higher likelihood of harm 
during sport was mediated by moral reasoning and past moral behavior whereas the lower 
likelihood of care during sport was mediated by moral reasoning. The mediation analyses 
provided novel evidence linking bracketed moral reasoning and past moral behavior with 
likelihood of acting badly, revealing a close coupling between moral thought and action 
across the sport and life contexts. The present data replicate, extend, and qualify Bredemeir 
and Shields' (1986a, 1986b) theory of game reasoning. 
The findings that intended and past antisocial behavior directed towards opponents were 
more likely when playing sport than the equivalent intimidatory behavior directed towards 
students at university provides further support for bracketed moral behavior (Kavussanu, et 
al., 2013). This form of antisocial behavior was also deemed to be less wrong in sport than 
life, replicating the game reasoning phenomenon reported by Bredemeir and Shields (1984, 
1986a, 1986b) and Bredemeir (1994, 1995). In contrast, intended and past antisocial behavior 
directed towards teammates were less likely when playing sport than the equivalent 
criticizing behavior directed towards students at university providing evidence for bracketed 
moral behavior (Kavussanu, et al., 2013). That this form of antisocial behavior was also 
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deemed to be more wrong in sport than life appears, at least at first glance, to be directly at 
odds with game reasoning as originally reported (Bredemeir & Shields, 1984, 1986a, 1986b). 
These contrasting effects highlight the importance of the in-group/out-group status of the 
recipient of the conduct. The discrepancy observed in bracketed morality between antisocial 
behavior toward opponents/students and antisocial behavior toward teammates/students may 
be explained at least in part by the psychology (e.g., Hewstone, et al, 2002; Tajfel, et al, 
1971) and morality (e.g., Graham, et al., 2013) of groups. People act favorably toward 
members of their group due to in-group loyalty and unfavorably towards outsiders due to out-
group betrayal (e.g., Allport, 1954; Brewer, 2007). In sport, opponents may be viewed as 
outsiders who can be harmed for the benefit of the in-group whereas teammates may be 
viewed as insiders who should not be harmed to ensure in-group cohesion. In sum, our 
understanding of game reasoning and bracketed morality surrounding issues of harm/care (as 
well as other moral foundations) can be improved by recognizing the moderating influence 
on moral thought and action of the principle of in-group loyalty versus out-group betrayal. 
Group dynamics can also explain contextual differences in reasoning about and 
performance of prosocial deeds. Moral reasoning about the perceived immorality of failing to 
stop and help someone revealed that inaction was deemed less wrong in sport compared to 
everyday life. This effect for moral reasoning in this altruistic dilemma was predictive of 
future inaction in such as situation and past inaction in similar situations. Taken together 
these data replicate the game reasoning (Bredemeir, 1994, 1995; Bredemeir & Shields, 1984, 
1986a, 1986b) and game behavior (Kavussanu et al., 2013) noted in previous research. As 
above, these findings can explained by group dynamics: caring may be an manifestation of 
in-group loyalty in sport and lack of caring an expression of out-group prejudice (e.g., 
Brewer, 2007; Graham, et al., 2013). Specifically, when playing sport, the team’s opponents 
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may be viewed as outsiders who do not need to be cared for as doing may not be beneficial or 
may perhaps be detrimental to the goals of the in-group. 
The current findings imply that our moral thoughts and actions when we enter different social 
contexts may be manifestations of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Moreover, 
our understanding of athletes as saints and sinners can be improved by appreciating the full 
complexity of the group environment in which they find themselves. The theory of game 
reasoning could be updated to incorporate the new evidence presented here. Moreover, it 
remains to be determined whether individual differences in the moral self, such as moral 
identity (Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014), moral disengagement (Kavussanu, Ring, 
& Kavanagh, 2014), and moral emotions (Proios, 2012), may mitigate and moderate 
bracketed morality. 
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Table 1        
Summary Analyses Comparing Sport School  Contexts In and 
Dilemma /    Factor    
Behavior  Context  Gender  Context Gender 
  F(1, 370) η2 F(1, 370) η2 F(1, η2 
    Likelihood to Behave   
AB O/S:  Intimidate 10.55 *** .028 31.72 *** .079 1.22 .003 
AB TM/S: Criticize 17.47 *** .045 2.83 .008 1.07 .003 
PB O/S: Stop to 133.38 *** .265 13.99 *** .036 17.89 .046 
PB O/S: Lend 0.76 .002 2.97 .008 0.08 .000 
    Wrongness of   
AB O/S: Intimidate 16.78 *** .043 46.54 *** .112 0.63 .002 
AB TM/S: Criticize 0.34 .001 2.96 .008 3.43 .009 
PB O/S: Stop to 103.31 *** .218 8.44 ** .022 9.37 .025 
PB O/S: Lend 9.05 ** .024 4.50 * .012 0.87 .002 
    Past    
AB O/S: Intimidate 93.32 *** .205 10.96 *** .029 11.60 .030 
AB TM/S: Criticize 19.60 *** .050 11.57 *** .030 0.52 .001 
PB O/S: Stop to 15.35 *** .040 12.11 *** .032 0.70 .002 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. AB = antisocial behavior, PB = prosocial behavior, 
O/S = opponent/student, TM/S = teammate/student 
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